




7 June 1984

NOTE	FOR:					OS/PPG		
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Here's a copy of Energy's comments on the ORCON marking, which will be discussed at the 13 June SECOM meeting. I've sent a copy to direct; also one to

SECOM



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Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545

JUN 5 1984

Chairman, DCI Security Committee Room 5E25 CIA Headquarters Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear

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At the May 16, 1984, Security Committee meeting, you handed out a proposed change in the definition of "Information Controlled by Originator" (ORCON) contained in the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information", and requested our comments.

In our opinion, the proposed words do not change the meaning of the paragraph. We believe there is neither a benefit nor a problem with making the change.

However, the discussion at the meeting brought up the following two important issues:

- 1. There is not a good definition or a consistent understanding of what constitutes "Headquarters elements". DOE is a decentralized organization. Our Operations Office Managers are responsible directly to the Secretary of Energy and, while they must operate within Department regulations, they have a high degree of local authority and independence. We interpret the DCID to prohibit our providing them ORCON, which we would like to do. Other organizations appear to treat such elements as an extension of their Headquarters.
- 2. The ORCON designation is used very extensively. Several of the attendees believe that it is being applied in cases where it is unnecessary. We believe that this is true for both the ORCON and NOCONTRACT markings. Such an overly conservative approach can effectively deny the ability to provide important intelligence or, at the least, create additional work in arranging for such markings to be removed.

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Within the general area of NSI the Information Security Oversight Office has the authority to review and check for classification abuses. In the area of intelligence there appears to be no provision for such a review. We believe that SECOM could provide an important community service by:

Continuing to stress the need to mark documents appropriately and establish a review program and periodically survey the various community programs for compliance.

Sincerely.

Martin J. Dowd

Division of Security Office of Safeguards & Security

Defense Programs

